My initial thought is that if this isn't a new compromise, Trivy must not have rotated the old credentials. They claim, however,
> We rotated secrets and tokens, but the process wasn't atomic and attackers may have been privy to refreshed tokens
… does anyone know what exactly they're talking about, here? To my knowledge, GH does not divulge new tokens after they're issued, but it depends on the exact auth type we're talking about, and GH has an absurd number of different types of tokens/keys one can use.
second breach in a month from the same initial credential compromise. the first rotation didn't fully revoke access. the attacker walked right back in. no persistence needed.
So the first incident was on March 19th and the second incident is March 22nd —- evidently the attackers maintained persistence through maybe two separate credential rotation efforts.
Friendly reminder that just because someone is building security software it doesn't mean they are competent and won't cause more harm than good.
Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
I audited Trivy's GitHub Actions a while back and found some worrying things, the most worrying bit was in the setup-trivy Action where it was doing a clone of main of the trivy repo and executing a shell script in there. There was no ref pinning until somebody raised a PR a few months ago. So a security company gave themselves arbitrary code execution in everyone's CI workflows.
Aqua were breached earlier this month, failed to contain it, got breached again last week, failed to contain it again, and now the attackers have breached their Docker Hub account. Shit happens but they're clearly not capable of handling this and should be enlisting outside help.
Granting broad access to "security" tools so some vendor can take another shot at your prod keys is not risk reduction.
Most of these things are just report printers that makes more noise than a legacy SIEM, and once an attacker is inside they don't do much besides dump findings into a dashboard nobody will read.
If you want less self-inflicted damage, stick new scanners in a tight sandbox, feed them read-only miror data, and keep them away from prod perms until they have earned trust with a boring review of exactly what they touch and where the data goes.
Otherwise you may as well wire your secrets to a public pastebin and call it testing.
Most of corporate security nowadays involves "endpoint security solutions" installed on all devices, servers and VMs, piping everything into an AI-powered dashboard so we can move fast and break everything.
Wasn't this discovered already last week, on Friday, that the threat actor had replaced the legit images with malware images? And republished 75 out of 76 tags?
No, the actor reappeared. This article is not fully updated. On March 22nd, the actor compromised their DockerHub account and published new Docker images.
The sandbox will need internet access (to update data) and you will need to send code to test into it; so compromise already equals leaking all your code, without even breaking the sandboxing
> The sandbox will need internet access (to update data) and you will need to send code to test into it; so compromise already equals leaking all your code, without even breaking the sandboxing
Compromising all code in one directory is bad.
Compromising all my data in all other directories, including mounted cloud drives, is worse.
I restrict most dev tools to access only the current directory.
Whenever possible, credentials shouldn't be inside the sandbox either. Credential proxying, or transparent credential injection, for example with Sandcat: https://github.com/VirtusLab/sandcat
> We rotated secrets and tokens, but the process wasn't atomic and attackers may have been privy to refreshed tokens
… does anyone know what exactly they're talking about, here? To my knowledge, GH does not divulge new tokens after they're issued, but it depends on the exact auth type we're talking about, and GH has an absurd number of different types of tokens/keys one can use.
So the first incident was on March 19th and the second incident is March 22nd —- evidently the attackers maintained persistence through maybe two separate credential rotation efforts.
Trivy ecosystem supply chain temporarily compromised - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47450142 - March 2026 (35 comments)
Every month the security team wants me to give full code or cloud access to some new scanner they want to trial. They love the fancy dashboards and lengthy reports but if I allowed just 10% of what they wanted we would be pwned on the regular...
Aqua were breached earlier this month, failed to contain it, got breached again last week, failed to contain it again, and now the attackers have breached their Docker Hub account. Shit happens but they're clearly not capable of handling this and should be enlisting outside help.
If you want less self-inflicted damage, stick new scanners in a tight sandbox, feed them read-only miror data, and keep them away from prod perms until they have earned trust with a boring review of exactly what they touch and where the data goes. Otherwise you may as well wire your secrets to a public pastebin and call it testing.
Compromising all code in one directory is bad. Compromising all my data in all other directories, including mounted cloud drives, is worse.
I restrict most dev tools to access only the current directory.