14 comments

  • kccqzy 6 minutes ago
    There’s apparently no writeup on exactly what was the fix. So I’m going to make a guess that this is the chromium commit that fixed the problem: https://source.chromium.org/chromium/chromium/src/+/224140d4...

    And this commit contained a refactoring from BROTLI_BOOL to BrotliDecoderErrorCode so the situation was that probably one of the error conditions previously simply returned false but needed more detail about what went wrong to continue safely.

    Well either that or this change from `if (prev_ix < cur_ix)` to `if (prev_ix < cur_ix && cached_backward <= max_backward)`.

  • anonymous908213 48 minutes ago
    I could do without every memory bug getting a cute sensational name and marketing push, I have to say.
    • lovich 33 minutes ago
      that ship sailed a while ago. Rowhammer is the first one I can remember
      • vinkelhake 31 minutes ago
        Let's not forget about heartbleed!
        • judge2020 14 minutes ago
          Back in the email days the virus authors named them, e.g. YouAreAnIdiot, ILoveYou
        • mhio 28 minutes ago
          That was the first exploit logo I can recall
  • cpburns2009 5 minutes ago
  • rvanlaar 1 hour ago
    It looks like brotli <= 1.2.0 is vulnerable.

    The python package has already been updated to 1.2.1. https://pypi.org/project/brotli/1.2.1/

  • adzm 1 hour ago
    Interestingly the commit that fixes this in brotli dates back to February https://github.com/google/brotli/commit/0ed4268a4401abcb4472...
  • kylepomykala 30 minutes ago
    They just keep coming, don't they?
    • hoppp 9 minutes ago
      Never gonna stop. Consider it normal. Hey, at least humans still have a job. Incident response
      • awakeasleep 6 minutes ago
        Let's not kid ourselves, llm's are already doing the incident response for this in many infrastructure teams
        • hoppp 0 minutes ago
          But they don't respond with fear and flailing arms!
  • Sytten 1 hour ago
    Since I checked Rust servers should be fine since the brotli crate is not a binding on the C.
  • cowlevel 2 hours ago
    Likely mitigation: disable brotli (br) content-encoding on both sides
    • thayne 14 minutes ago
      Unfortunately, AFAICT, there is no way to do this for node's fetch. I suspect there are other client libraries that don't have a way to disable it.
  • dboreham 39 minutes ago
    This is a better article: https://www.aikido.dev/blog/python-packages-vulnerable-node2...

    and this is the actual CVE report, which doesn't say much: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-111497

  • profdevloper 1 hour ago
  • QuadmasterXLII 1 hour ago
    is flask hello world with gunicorn behind apache vulnerable?
    • TZubiri 1 hour ago
      what I can say is that a 5 liner hello world starting with ‘import socket’ is not affected

      whether a hello wolrd in fastapi is affected might also be interesting

  • DogeGode 1 hour ago
    Another day, another buffer-overflow vulnerability in C code …
  • bogomind 1 hour ago
    [flagged]
  • bibekadhikari 57 minutes ago
    Worth checking how brotli actually reaches your stack. In Node it's bundled into the runtime itself (zlib's brotli support), so an audit of your package tree won't surface it the way a normal dependency would - the fix arrives with a runtime release, not a package bump. The Python package on PyPI is already at 1.2.1. Until your runtime picks up the patched brotli, refusing br content-encoding at the edge seems like the fastest mitigation.
    • thayne 10 minutes ago
      > refusing br content-encoding at the edge seems like the fastest mitigation.

      That's pretty difficult if you make outbound requests, and don't already have a TLS interception proxy set up.